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While

G.

you

of September 17th,
up some possible misunderstandings of his own position, on the main point at
issue between objective monism and that form of agnosticism which appears to its advocates to be the
only logical outcome of modern philosophical thought,
Dr. Carus's statement seems to be an explanation
which does not explain.
While I have no desire to prolong the controversy,
or to weary the readers of The Open Court by the reis

in

The Open Court

of interest as clearing

my

iteration of the positions taken in

former

article, a

and jusMr. Spencer, seem to require a brief reply to
Dr. Carus
As to Mr. Spencer's position, I prefer to

permit him to speak in his own language, in passages
By reference to
selected from his published works.

such passages as most clearly represent his agnostic
to

and

show

from

his anti-materialistic philosophy,

cism

my own

tum

is

of

I

hope

that his position does not essentially differ
as set forth in the article on "Philo-

sophical Agnosticism and

Monism";

that his agnosti-

will, as

symbols,

is

the point

:

a reality.

What

is

If

so,

my

question

is

again to

the nature of this process, regarded

as monistic, apart from

its

symbolical mental and ma-

terial interpretations?

In further confirmation of the agnostic position,

asserted by myself, moreover, Dr. Carus finally con-

"The term

fesses, (p. 2955):

'reality'

means nothing

but actual being and cannot give us any information
about the innermost nature of being." This is precisely
what the agnostic claims. The "particular qualities
of reality,"

i.

e.

its

modes

of affecting

our

finite

con-

sciousness, can be definitely described and defined.
Its

innermost nature, however,

tion.

The

is

fact that the objective

incapable of defini-

monist "can

see no

modern psychology respecting the nature

tial

of

—

;

;

thought-symbols by Dr. Carus's own clear definition,
quoted in my previous article, are mere abstractions "
'

'

upon which

When

as realities "is a self-mystifica-

he affirms in the note,

2948) that
"mental as well as material processes, in my opinion
(p.

I confess to a mystification on my part
no degree enlightened by the additional
explanation that "they are no realities if considered
by themselves as abstract ideas." Consider them how

are realities,"

which

Dollars per Yea
Single Copies, 5 Cts.

use" in forming a concept of "the innermost, essen-

however, permit me a brief word in reply to Dr.
Carus's comments on my previous article.
Commencing with the confession that he does not
know what I mean by the innermost, intrinsic and essential nature of reality, he proceeds to affirm what I
have never denied that "the representation of realUndoubtedly
ity in thought-symbols /.f knowledge."
but of what? Of the thought- symit is knowledge
this, and nothing more.
And these
bols, of course

tion."

Two

a natural and logical deduction from the dic-

our knowledge, and that his anti-materialistic position
First,
is clearly defined and logically maintained.

to look

I

"processes" or as "abstract ideas," they
If "mental and material processes are realities" then reality is not one but dual.
This assertion of Dr. Carus's is the logical negation of
Monism.
But perhaps my critic meant to assert, not that
^'mental and material processes are realities," but that
the actual process which appears in our consciousness
on the one hand as mental and on the other as material, under the necessary interpretation of our thought-

clear understanding of the question at issue,
tice to

attitude

I

are disparate and dual.

JANES.

the article of Dr. Carus on " Spencerian

Agnosticism,"

1891.

22,

is

in

and intrinsic nature of reality as a whole " does not
imply that Reality possesses no intrinsic character
apart from its modes of affecting our consciousness
;

it

implies rather that the mind of the objective monist

phase of the proband that his agnosticism is therefore implicit merely, though no less actual while that
of the Spencerian is clearly thought out, explicit and
ceases to think just as this particular

lem comes

in view,

;

The realms of admitted knowability
Monist and the Spencerian are identical and coextensive. No possibility of thought and investigation
which is open to the former is closed to the latter.
The Spencerian, however, perceives that parallel and
co-ordinate with the infinite realm of relative knowlfrankly confessed.

of the

edge which symbolically interprets the effects of Reality
in dual and disparate terms of mental and material processes to our finite consciousness, lies an infinite realm
of Reality in its essential, intrinsic constitution, which
Yet there are
the finite mind can never penetrate.
not two infinites, but one and the same infinite RealThe idea of modes of existence which are "abity.

—
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the finite mind is, therefore,
solutely unknowable
not abandoned by the disclaimer that agnosticism implies the assertion of the unknowability of reality /cr
If the perception of this truth is indeed a "botsc.
" to

tomless abyss," as Dr. Carus declares, which "impels man to stop thinking," the only difference between the objective Monist and the Spencerian agnostic is that the former stops thinking before he reaches
the edge of the abyss, and plunges blindly in, while

the agnostic clearly sees

it

before him, and dechnesto

attempt the hopeless task of fathoming its unsearchThat the agnostic conception implies a
able depths.

profound mystery at the heart of Being I have nowhere denied. With Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske I
confess -that I can see no complete solution of this
mystery while finite consciousness endures. "What I
did affirm and hereby reaffirm is that the doctrine of
the Unknowable does not rest upon any "mystery"

any supernaturalist or metaphysical basis, for its exbut is a logical deduction from the simplanation,
plest demonstrated facts of psychological science.
This doctrine as asserted by Mr. Spencer rests
primarily upon "the antithesis of subject and object,

—

never to be transcended while consciousness lasts."*
Precisely here I have rested it in my own argument.
In "First Principles," additional arguments, based on
the well-sustained claim that this is "the deepest, widest,

and most certain

of all facts,"

—a

fact in

which

science unites with philosophy and religion in recogand supported by the considerations deduced
nising,

—

William Hamilton and Dean Mansel from the
nature of mind and consciousness, are brought forward in its support. Finally, from the nature of Life
itself as the continued adjustment of inner-relations to
outer relations, the necessary relativity of our knowledge is argued, and the actuality and reality of the

by

Sir

Unknowable

is

maintained against those writers

who

claim that the words "Infinite" and "Absolute" exBut it is in the "Prinpress merely negative ideas.

where the nature of mind and
knowledge is expressly treated, that the clearest statements of the fundamental principles of Spencerian agciples of Psychology,"

nosticism are to be found.
In the section entitled

Physical Synthesis,"
i,

pp. 616-627.)

Mr.

fairly states the position of the Materialist,

the Spiritualist, and of that yet more refined school of
thought which makes Motion the supreme reality un-

mental

derlying

all

of these

views

position.

and again in the earlier parts
was taken, that the truth is not
expressible either by materialism or by spiritualism, however
modified and however refined. Let me now, for the last time, set
forth the ultimate implications of the argument running through
this volume as well as through preceding volumes.
" Carried to whatever extent, the inquiries of the psychologist
do not reveal the ultimate nature of mind any more than do the
'

First Principles,'

of the present work, the position

;

inquiries of the chemist reveal the ultimate nature of matter, or

activities,

and shows why neither

is illustrative of

his

The passage continues

own

philosophical

(§ 272):

"Comparatively consistent as is this answer, and serving
though it does to throw back with added force the reproaches of
In the closthe spiritualist, it is not the answer to be here given.
* "Principles of Psychology," Vol.

i.

p. 62.

(English Edition.)

Though

those of the physicist the ultimate nature of motion.

chemist

gravitating towards the belief that there

is

is

the

a primitive

atom, out of which by variously-arranged unions are formed the socalled elements, as out of these by variously-arranged unions are

formed

oxides, acids,

plex substances

;

and salts, and the multitudinous more comknows no more than he did at first about
atom.
And similarly, though we have

yet he

this hypothetical primitive

seen reason for thinking that there

is

a primitive unit of conscious-

ness, that sensations of all orders are

formed

of

such units com-

bined in various relations, that by the compounding of these sen-

and their various relations are produced perceptions and
and so on up to the highest thoughts aiid emotions yet this
Suppose it to have beunit of consciousness remains inscrutable.
come quite clear that a shock in consciousness and a molecular
motion, are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing
sations

ideas

;

;

we continue

utterly incapable

.6f

uniting the two, so as to cojiceive

Let us consider

that reality of w/iicJi they are the opposite faces.*

how

either face is framed in our thoughts.
" The conception of a rhythmically moving

matter

is

mass of sensible

a synthesis of certain states of consciousness that stand

related in a certain succession.

The conception

of a rhythmically

moving molecule, is one in which these states and their relations
have been reduced to the extremest limits of dimension representable to the mind, and are then assumed to be further reduced far
beyond the limits of representation. So that this rhythmically
moving molecule, which is our unit of composition of external
phenomena, is mental in a three-fold sense our experiences of a
rhythmically moving mass, whence the conception of it is derived,
are states of mind, having objective counterparts that are unknown the derived conception of a rhythmically moving molecule,
is formed of states of mind that have no directly-presented objecand when we try to think of the rhythmtive counterparts at all
ically moving molecule as we suppose it to exist, we do so by
imagining that we have re-represented these representative states,
on an infinitely reduced scale. So that the unit out of which we
build our interpretation of material phenomena, is triply ideal.
"On the other hand, what do we think of this ideal unit, considered as a portion of mind ? It arises, as we have seen, by synthesis of many feelings, real and ideal, and of the many changes
among them. What are feelings ? What is changed ? And what
changes it ? If to avoid obvious implications of materiality, we
call each element of this ideal unit, a state of consciousness, we

—

;

;

The conception

only get into similar implications.

"The

(Principles of Psychology, Vol.

Spencer

COURT.

ing paragraphs of

of a state of

consciousness implies the conception of an existence which has the

When

decomposing certain of our feelings we find them
state.
formed of minute shocks, succeeding one another with different
rapidities and in different combinations
and when we conclude
that all our feelings are probably formed of such units of consciousness variously combined, we are still obliged to conceive of
this unit of consciousness as a change wrought by some force in
in

(

;

No

something.

effort of the

imagination enables us to think of a

shock, however minute, except as undergone by an entity.

We are

compelled, therefore, to postulate a substance of mind that
fected, before

my

*

See

t

The word

materiality.

we can

simila

think of

its affections.

argument. The Opex Court, Sept,

" sh )ck," certainly in Mi

,

is

af-

But we can form no
17, p. 2948.

Spencer's u e of

it,

does not imply

THE OPEN
notion of a substance oi

mind absolutely divested

of attributes

connoted by the word substance and all such attributes are abstracted from our experiences of material phenomena. Expel from
the conception of mind every one of those attributes by which we
;

distinguish an external something from an external nothing, and

the conception of mind becomes nothing.
culty

we

repudiate the expression

each undecomposable feeling

'

'

A

consciousness

'

if

diffi-

and

we merely

a consciousness,'

of one difficulty into another.

escape this

If to

state of consciousness

call

get out

not the state of

a thing. And as many different consciousnesses
many different things there are. How shall we
think of these so many independent things, having their differential characters, when we have excluded all conceptions derived
from external phenomena ? We can think of entities which differ
a thing

itself

is

as there are, so

COURT.
;

than even the highest manifestations of human consciousness that it transcends consciousness "as much
as consciousness transcends a plant's functions," then
they would perceive how futile and unfair is an argument based upon the ordinary materialistic conceptions of matter

objective and material.

Again,

how

are

we

we

distinguished as

to conceive these con-

sciousnesses as either being changed one into another or as being
?
We cannot do this without conceiving
and we know nothing of cause save as manifested in ex-

replaced one by another
of cause

istences

;

we

class as material

—either

ing things.
" See then our predicament.

terms of mind.

When we
most

We

own

bodies or surround-

can think of matter only in

can think of mind only in terms of matter.

have pushed our e.xplorations of the

limit,

we

when we have
back

We

our

first to

the utter-

are referred to the second for a final answer

we

got the final answer of the second

to the first for

an interpretation of

We

it.

;

and

are referred

find the value of

terms of y; then we find the value of y in terms of x; and
we may continue forever without coming nearer to a solution.
The antithesis of subject and object, never to be trnns:ei:ded
while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all hwivledje of that

-r

in

so on

Ultimate Reality in which subject and olject are united.
" And this brings us to the true conclusion implied through-

— the conclusion that

it is

form proves

to

This somewhat lengthy passage,

I

think,

shows

careful

and symsuch a

is

THE CASE OF AGNOSTICISM REVISED.

We

freely concur with Dr. Lewis G. Janes in the
main point on which he so vigorously insists, that Mr.

Herbert Spencer's philosophy is not "materialistic in
Acimplications," for undoubtedly it is agnostic.
cording to Mr. Spencer, the underlying reality is and
remains unknowable. Dr. Janes, however, goes too
far, when he characterises Mr. Spencer's philosophy as

its

His position

anti-materialistic.

is

not anti-material-

but non-materialistic. According to the agnostic
principles, we do not know anything about "the reality underlying what we conceive as matter and moistic,

it might be spirit, it might be matter, it might
be anything natural, yet it might be something of
which we have no notion, it might be something that
is not found in the realm of nature, it might be super-

tion,"

natural.

one

be inscrutable, the order of its manifestations throughout all mental phenomena proves to be the same as
the order of its manifestations throughout all material phenomena."
either

To no

misapprehension possible.

and the same
Ultimate Reality which is manifested to us subjectively and objectively.
For while the nature of that which is manifested under
out the foregoing pages,

and motion.

pathetic student of Mr. Spencer, however,

from one another and from nonentity, only by bringing into our
thoughts the remembrances of entities which

2993

something entirely different from matter and motion
as so much higher in its nature
as we conceive them

I.

MR. ELLIS THURTELL'S AGNOSTICISM.

Dr. Janes

is

not satisfied with

my

explanation, be-

does not explain the main point at issue between monism and agnosticism. But the trouble with
agnosticism is that it is a Proteus constantly changing
under our hands. Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy
cause

it

many

interpretations.

Whom

have we

to

clearly, (i) the irrefragable psychological foundation

admits of

agnosticism in the antithesis of subject and object, "never to be transcended while consciousness lasts"
(2) the anti-materialistic character

accept as the orthodox Spencerian, Professor Fiske or
Mr. Ellis Thurtell? Mr. Ellis Thurtell comments in

of philosophical

The

AgTiostic Journal, (xxix, 12)

September

19, 1891,

;

of

Mr. Spencer's psychology

;

and

(3) the monistic

upon

the discussion of agnosticism which appeared in

The Open Court, No. 207, saying that he wants

foundation on which his entire philosophy is based
"it is one and the same Ultimate Reality which is

Dr. Janes's

manifested to us subjectively and objectively."

He

:

Those

critics

who

Spencer's philosoph}'

is

persist in

asserting that Mr.

materialistic in its implications

constantly ignore the fact that he everywhere affirms
that the reality underlying what we conceive as matter

says

If they would keep constantly in view the fact that
Mr. Spencer regards the Ultimate Reality as one as
;

to

know

construction of "living in the spirit."

:

would be a most remarkable thing if so representative a
Spencerian as the President of the Brooklyn Ethical Association
'

'

seems
istic

It

to be,

had any ardent yearnings toward the supernatural-

short-cut of theological lore. ..."
I

and motion can by no means be identical with matter
and motion, but must be something essentially differImporting into their own and his thought the
ent.
ordinary conceptions of matter and motion, they find
no difficulty in showing how absurd is the incongruity
when consciousness is supposed to emerge from them.

own

do not see that Dr. Janes's and Professor Fiske's

position can be characterised as a yearning toward
Nevertheless, their insupernaturalism or theology.
terpretation of Spencerianism differs widely from that
of

Mr. Ellis Thurtell. The latter is by no means ready
He says
view of Spencerianism.

to accept their

" Herbert Spencer

:

is

perpetually, throughout his various vol-

umes, impressing upon his

many misunderstanding

readers that

his implications are neither necessarily Materialistic nor necessarily

;

THE OPEN
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Spiritualistic,

and that the strife between Materialist and Spirita war of words. Quite unequivocal are his

ualist is substantially

continuous statements that it is immaterial in which of these two
terms of thought we choose to express our conceptions of mind and

terms of both Materialistic and
merely symbols, such as those of algebra,
for the expression of what is, in the last resort, a reality unknown,
Herbert Spencer is most
if not, indeed, unknowable as well.
evidently agnostic on this point. It is to his mind as much beyond
the present scope of human knowledge as is the question of the
matter

that, in point of fact, the

;

Spiritualistic thought are

ultimate causation of the universe

itself.

are to

These clearly and strongly put views of our great philosopher
be found not only in an earlier edition of his works, but also

in the

very

'
'

latest,

which, in

its

now

entirety, is

before me.

This

together with the equally indisputable one of Dr. Fiske hav-

fact,

ing built up a certain far from Agnostic theory called

Theism,'

may

serve to cast

Cosmic
some doubt upon the importance of

COURT.
The

recent discussion of the Brooklyn Ethical As-

sociation
is

grew hottest concerning the question: What

the corner-stone of Mr. Spencer's philosophy, the

correlation of forces, or the doctrine of the relativity
of

knowledge?

Mr. Spencer has repeatedly spoken
and thoughts as being trans-

of sensations, emotions,

formed motion yet on other occasions he has also
expressed the view that mind and matter are opposite
faces of one and the same unknowable reality.
Now
it was maintained by the disputants, that if these two
"faces" could not be transformed the one into the
other, Mr. Spencer would have to give up his doctrine
;

of the correlation of forces.

'

what Dr. Fiske himself is said to have revealed to the assembled
company on this eventful evening. The revelation was nothing
less than the assertion that Herbert Spencer had confessed, in
Correlation of Forces'
1874, to a change of opinion upon the
question, and had acquiesced in the construction Dr. Fiske had
placed upon his philosophy as a whole. With every respect for
the author of
Cosmic Philosophy,' it seems to me that, failing
any positive written statement from Herbert Spencer upon the
precise point at issue, we should all do well to content ourselves
with the exposition of his views, so lucidly and (as I think) so consistently set forth in the fifth edition of First Principles,' and in

Let us stop here.

The

correlation of forces can-

not be given up either by Mr. Spencer or by any one.

The

doctrine of the correlation of forces

Spencerian or agnostic, or

cifically

is

not spe-

positivistic,

or

'

'

'

the third edition of

during

last year.

'

Principles of Psychology," both published

Upon

the authority of these volumes,

submit
that both Dr. Janes and Dr. Fiske have, in some measure, misrepresented the matured views of our great philosopher of Agnosticism and Evolution, and that Herbert Spencer has neither
changed the base of his philosophy, by putting into the background
the principle of 'Persistence of Force,' nor has repudiated, with
his latest breath, any one of the assertions contained in the passages quoted by the Spiritualist from New York."
I

monistic.

proceed to discuss Dr. Janes's position
and the passage quoted by him from Mr. Spencer, I
have to make a few comments on Mr. Ellis Thurtell's
proposition.
We maintain in opposition to Mr. Herbert Spencer's or anybody's agnosticism, that knowledge means description in mental symbols and reality
can be described in mental symbols. Reality is not unknowable. And we maintain at the same time that
I

the different problems of causation are by no means beyond the present scope of human knowledge. Mr.
Thurtell speaks of "the question of the ultimate causation of the universe."
Does that mean how the universe originated out of nothing?

answered by the law
energy.

ing

;

it

That question is
and

of the conservation of matter

The universe did not originate out of nothis eternal.
The term "eternal" means that it

has existed, and that it will exist ; it has
never been created out of nothing and can never disappear into nothing.
exists, that

By

it

the bye,

cannot approve of such word-combinations as "ultimate causation." To speak of causation as "ultimate " implies at the start a lack of clearness concerning the meaning of "cause" and must
I

necessarily impHcate us in inextricable contradictions.

common

property.

No sound

thinker

age doubts that any one force is transWhat Mr. Spencer and with
him his followers, Professor Fiske included, will have
to give up, is simply the idea that psychic states are
at the present

formable into another.

Psychic states, i. e. feelings, are states of
awareness
they are neither forces nor transformed
shocks.

;

forces.

Says Leibnitz
"

We are

:

constrained to confess that perception and whatever

depends upon it, are inexplainable upon mechanical principles
that is by reference to forms and movements.
If we could imagine a machine the operation of which would manufacture thoughts,
feelings, and perceptions, and could think of it as enlarged in all
its

Before

It is

proportions, so that

then

we would

find in

it

we could go

into

it

as into a mill, even

nothing but particles jostling each other,

and never anything by which perception could be explained."
If we could go into the brain, we should see blood
rushing through nervous structures, we should see cer-

tain parts of the latter, receiving the blood, oxydise

and thus change
energy.

Our

potential

energy into kinetic

cicerone, supposing

we had some one who

its

knew

all about it, might point out the different spots
where feelings are taking place, and yet we should see
no feelings. We should only see "particles jostling
each other." And why? Because feelings are not mo-

tions.

Feelings are not objective processes, they are

subjective processes, they are not visible, they are not

observable.

They can only be

felt, for

they are states

of awareness.

How we think subject and object as one, has been
explained in other places and need not be discussed
here.

(See

"The

Soul of

Man"

pp. 1-46.)

Sensations in one sense are transformed force.

By

"sensation" we generally understand a physiological
process which in some part

is

accompanied with

feel-

The physiological process of a sensation is a
breaking down of nervous substance, it is the setting
free of a certain amount of potential energy. As such
ing.

•

THR OREN
it is

But the

mechanical.

A

not mechanical.
sider

it

feeling of the sensation

is

con-

as a special kind of feeling, a feeling of sight,

or a sound, a taste or an odor

By

force.

we

sensation in so far as

feeling

we understand

not

is

transformed

that state of aware-

ness which appears while a certain kind and

amount

through some
irritation.
The physiological process is a shock the
psychical state is no shock, it is simply awareness.
Concerning the non-interconvertibility of feeling
and motion. Professor Fiske and Dr. Janes cannot be
of nerve-substance is being disturbed

;

said to have, as Mr. Thurtell declares, in

some meas-

ure misrepresented Mr. Spencer's views

;

they have
simply tried with a friendly hand to eliminate the
consequences of a mistake.
DR. LEWIS G. J.ANES'S AGNOSTICISM.

II.

COURT.
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the action that takes place in

some

nerve-structure.

Popularly speaking, feeling beings are not aware of
their physiological brain activity, but of the purport

and meaning of their physiological brain activity alone.
No one seeing a tree and thinking of it is aware of or
has a knowledge of a thought symbol.
Every one
seeing a tree and thinking of it, is aware of and knows
a certain contents of a thought-symbol of his which
we call a tree he is aware of the tree itself. That
the means through which a man knows a tree is the
symbolism of sensations and the activity of nervous
structures, re-constructing in some way the picture of
a tree in feeling substance, is not at all immediate
knowledge on the contrary, it is the result of most
difficult and subtle investigations.
Sensations and thought-symbols are realities just
as much as any other processes of nature
and the objects represented in thought-symbols are, if true, also
realities. There are some thought-symbols which represent certain qualities or features abstracted in thought
from objects they are called abstracts. Such abstracts
;

;

;

Dr. Lewis G. Janes's agnosticism

is

based upon

the idea that knowledge, being the representation of
in thought-symbols, is a knowledge of the
thought-symbols and nothing more. This is a fundamental error, that calls for explanation and refutation.

reality

"Knowledge

the representation of reality in

is

thought-symbols" means that some process affects a
and causes a physiological disturbance
together with which a definite state of awareness
arises.
There is a tree from which innumerable rays
of light proceed. The tree is different from the picture
on the retina, and again the picture on the retina (the
latter being to some extent a chemical process) is different from the disturbance caused in the cortical centre
of vision. This disturbance again considered purely as
a physiological process is different from the state of
awareness which accompanies the process. Yet all
these events preserve a certain something in their
forms which they have in common and so the feeling
element in the sensation of a tree comes to represent
sentient being

The

the tree.
called

its

representative

contents.

Every kind

value of a feeling
of

sense-impression

is
is

followed by a special kind of feeling and thus the world

around us

is

mapped

out in feelings.

Ideas, abstract

thoughts, concepts are higher kinds of representative

They

feelings.

are symbols which represent whole

groups or generalisations

i.

e.

many

composites of

similar feelings.

Now we
edge

We

?

ask again with Dr. Janes,

answer and so does he

:

What

is

knowl-

Knowledge

is

the

;

are matter, motion, spirit, etc.

sented in abstracts are real also.

The qualities repreThey exist in and

But abstracts have not an existence by
There is no absolute motion and there
no gravity outside of gravitating bodies. Indeed

with things.
themselves.
is

things, (ourselves included) are such as they are

all

only in connection with the whole universe.
single object

is

Every

inseparable from the whole cosmos,

and if we speak of a thing we separate it in our thought
from the rest of the world. This separation however
is a fiction, which if persisted in, leads us to the absurd idea of things in themselves.
The whole universe is a vast system of relations,

and these relations are

reality itself.

There

is

nothing

unconditioned, nothing unrelated, nothing absolute.

Everything real

A

is,

and necessarily must

be, relative.

correct description of the relations of reality in the

mind of a feeling being is knowledge. To say that
we can know the relative, but cannot know the absolute or the unconditioned,
ivc

can

know

is

equivalent to saying that

that which exists hut

we can

never

know

that which does not exist.

That which is or can be represented in our mental
symbols, the contents of our sensations, i. e. of our
sense-symbols, being that with which we have to deal in
actual

life, is

generally called reality.
there

Now we

are told

another reality which cannot be

representation of reality in thought-symbols. Dr. Janes

that beside

proceeds to ask, "Knowledge; but of what? Of the
thought-symbols, of course this and nothing more."

represented in mental symbols and which can neither
directly nor indirectly affect man's consciousness. The

;

Here

is

a mistake.

No man

has a direct knowledge of

his thought-symbols as being thought-symbols.

Every

awareness is an awareness of the contents of
and we assume that the contents of each
state of awareness depends upon the special form of
state of

that state

;

it

is

former kind of reality is relative, the latter is absolute,
the former can be comprehended the latter is incomThe former is the proprehensible and unthinkable.
vince of the sciences,
the latter

is

commonly considered

as nature,

the innermost nature of reality, which " in

'

THE OPEN

2996
its

intrinsic constitution the finite*

essential,

—

mind

"while consciousness lasts."
can never penetrate,"
We can understand reality as a whole, i. e. we can
systematise our knowledge of the former in a unitary
world-conception

nermost nature
"

The mind

we cannot understand

yet

;

and

his agnosticism

therefore implicite merely, though no less actual."

The

objective monist ceases to think that which

according to the agnostic's statement

Suppose but

and incomprehensible.

is

unthinkable

for a

moment

that this unthinkable kind of a reality did not exist

and imagine that the former kind of reality, that which
can be represented in sense-symbols and with which
we have to deal in actual life existed alone, should we
then not be able to have a clear monistic world conception without the superimposed additions of agnosticism ?
Indeed we can do without the supposition of
a reality behind that which is usually called reality
and if we take our concepts of matter, motion, spirit,
;

of nature,

we need

most nature

psychology which contains several strange misstatements and ends with the usual refrain of his ergo
cer's

igtiorahimus.

Mr. Spencer

I cannot enter here in a discussion
impossible.
concerning the possible meaning of " primitive atoms,"
or "primitive units of consciousness," or "the rhythmically moving molecule which is our unit of composi-

tion of external

phenomena."

Still less

can

I

discuss

Mr. Spencer's belief in " the substance of mind;" such
a thing as "a substance of mind " is a meaningless and
self-contradictory, a misleading, and therefore a dan-

Nor do I intend to investigate the
gerous phrase.
paralogism that "the conception of a state of
consciousness implies the conception of an existence
old

which has the state." This is the basis of the old egopsychology which has been refuted a century ago by
Hume, by Kant, and many others after Kant. I shall
Mr. Spencer
limit myself to the main point at issue.

symbolising certain features

declares

"We

of reality as a whole.

artificially produces an inand concludes that all knowledge

is

not furthermore ask for the inner-

feeling, thought, etc., as

MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S AGNOSTICISM.

III.

Dr. Janes quotes a long passage from Mr. Spen-

extricable confusion

of the objective monist ceases to think just as this

particular phase of the problem comes in view
is

the in-

Says Dr. Janes:

of being.

COURT.

:

can think matter only in terms of mind and mind only
We find the value of x in terms of y ;
in terms of matter
in terms of x ; and so on we may conthen we find the value of
_)'

Nature

nature; degrees of innermost- ness do

is

not exist in Nature.
'

In a

Says Goethe

Naiur hat

zvedt'7

Atles ist sie

iiiti

way similar

of subject and

:

•

to that of

subject

Male."

Dr. Janes on the innermost

nature, Mr. Spencer speaks of the ultimate nature of

things

— of mind,

mate nature

is

of matter, of motion, etc.

always said to be unknowable.

the innermost or ultimate nature of a thing

can

mean

The

ulti-

What can
mean?

It

the essential quality of a thing or a process.

That however

is

not at

all

incapable of definition or

So for instance the essential quality of mind is symbolism
every mind is a system of
representative symbols in feeling substance.
The innermost and ultimate nature of something can also
mean its most general quality. Thus, for instance, what
is the most general quality of all matter?
It is that
which all kinds of matter have in common. Matter is
that which directly or indirectly can affect any one of
the senses. In either sense the innermost and ultimate
natures of things are knowable. What other meaning
the phrase can have I know not and am unable to sur-

incomprehensible.

;

Parenthetically I may state that the terms "huite mind,"
ness," and also " infinite reality " are illegitimate word-comt
ns.
(See
The Open Court, No. Z15, p. 2979.) Realities are always definii
concrete.
The infinite and infinitude are not objects, but unlimited, nfinished, and not
be finished processes or possibilities.

Every atom

is ir

spects.

lute " are

and object are

There

is

by no means "negative

" ideas.

ally in-

united,

some

The antithesis
lasts,

'

truth in the statement, that

can think matter only

in

"term" is incorrect.
e.
"terms" of mind,

terms of mind

";

yet the

"we
word

We

do not think matter in
which denote
mind, which characterise mind. We think matter in
terms which characterise matter. We ought to say
"matter as we think it," the idea "matter" is a
Everything we
mental symbol. This is a truism.
think, is thought only in so far as it is put in mental
This is true of matter and of motion, of
symbols.
possible and impossible things, of mind itself and of
anything we can imagine, even that which for some
reason or other is said to be inconceivable or, in case
i.

it

in expressions

contains self-contradictions,

is

actually inconceiv-

able.

There

is

some

truth also in the statement that

"we

can think mind only in terms of matter." Yet this
statement also wants a correction. We can think
rial

"

It has infinite possibilities of motion, of combinat
use such ptirases as infinite reality or finite minds, we b
volvtd in a confused conception of things. The terms " in

to a solution.

never to be transcended while consciousness

object,

mind only

mise.

to

coming nearer

renders impossible all knowledge of thai Ultimate Reality in which

n noch Schale,

t

tinue forever without

being.

of bodiless

mind of some real and mateOr negatively expressed we cannot think

as being the

minds, of ghosts.

Some people

believe

and imagine they can think bodiless minds
At any rate mind has to be thought, as
as realities.
everything else, in mental symbols and we can define
in terms which denote mental or psychical
it only
in ghosts

" abso

processes.

)
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Mr. Spencer in slightly altering these two truisms, (

which hides a

fallacy

In this way he enters into a vicious circle out of
which he cannot escape. Finding himself hopelesly
caught in the trap which he set for himself, he declares
that there is no way out of it.
This while consciousness lasts renders impossible all knowledge of that ultimate reality in which subject and object are united.
Indeed, such fallacies make knowledge impossible.
But, then, what is the Ultimate Reality in which
subject and object are united? Why, there is no "ulity.

timate"

reality.

Reality

there are no degrees of a

Can

is

either real or

more

it is

not real,

or less ultimate reality.

there be anything realer than real

?

which exists. This is a broad and
general statement, and from general statements you
If you wish to
cannot expect detailed explanations.
know what characteristics reality possesses you must
study it in detail and that is exactly what our scienIf you wish to know the nature of retists are doing.
ality go to science, study physics, chemistry, botany,
zoology, physiology, astronom)', and above all study
the propaedeutics of science, especially mathematics
and logic, the sciences of formal thought. All the results of these sciences are more or less actual knowledge. No science represents the whole of reality; every
science investigates one side of nature only, it moves
in some one special kind of abstraction. None of them
"
represents in a special degree "the innermost nature
Reality

is

There

is a

under the impression of profund-

that

of things, but all of

them represent some

real actual

qualities of nature,

we

might say

and

in this

sense

probably
States

is

TOPICS.

a story travelling round by the

is

false,

about

newspaper

send an autograph

letter of

United

congratulation to the

for admitting the

American pig into

Germany.

According to the story, a man-of-war ship will be speappointed to carry the letter, thus giving it a sort of regal

cially

and imperial dignity

which

;

it

would not have if simply dropped
American Minister at
is anxious to thank

into the post office, or even entrusted to the

The

Berlin.

President, say the newspapers,

the Emperor, " for an act of such signal importance to the entire
West, and in particular to the great pork industries of Chicago."
And, a member of the cabinet, name not given, is quoted as say-

"The elections West are near at hand, and the President
wishes to accentuate his success for the farming community in
practically opening the European markets to a great product."
ing,

" man-of-war " part of it gives a brackish flavor to the story,
and makes it look like a yarn prepared exclusively for the marines.
Such a letter would be diplomatically dangerous, and it might provoke the Emperor to write in reply, " Go thou and do likewise."
To thank the Germans for doing what we refuse to do, would be

The

The

to stultify ourselves for nothing.

We

enough alone.

well

let

may

President knows enough to

congratulate whomsoever

Vicarious atonement

is

no longer a theory, but a condition,

the state of Maine.

at least in

hibitory liquor law

commonwealth

In that

the pro-

vigorously enforced, and vigorously evaded.

is

has lately been discovered that in some parts of that state men
can be hired for two dollars a day to expiate the sins of others, by
It

dummy

acting as

saloon keepers in those very dry neighborhoods

where the prohibitory law actually prohibits. The duty of a dummy
substitute is to stand at a window, and by touching an electric
button notify the real proprietor whether an approaching customer
is

genuine or counterfeit, an orthodox disciple of St Bacchus, or
This duty requires that a dummy possess intuitive percep-

a spy.

tions keen

and true

as those of a pointer

dummy, when

the police

make

dog

It

is

also the duty

a raid on the saloon, to rep-

resent himself as the proprietor, and go to prison without
bling, thus

ture of reality.

the position until the old one returns from the wilderness,

justifies

Mr. Spencer's agnostic proposition that

knowledge

all

rendered impossible.
Agnosticism in whatever form it may appear (with
the sole exception of the Agnosticism of Modesty which
means judgment suspended so long as sufficient eviis

dence is missing) is throughout the outcome of some
erroneous reasoning. The faults of a lens appear on the
picture in the camera, and if no other information can
be had, are indistinguishable from the objects pictured.
So agnosticism is the confusion of the thoughts of a
thinker taken by him to be the objective reality of the
p. C.
world mirrored in his thoughts.

may

it

concern that the Germans have opened their gates to our swine,
but for all that, we shall continue to maintain a jealous barrier
against the pigs and pork of Germany.

that every one of

what we wish to
knowledge we propose guesses called hypotheses, and
that, however much we shall know, the whole world of
reality is so immeasurable and its relations are so infinite that we shall never and can never know it out,
But no amount of igis a fact that nobody disputes.
norance (which by the bye is something negative only)

and

line,

the effect that the Pres'dent of the

to
to

German Emperor thanking him

of the

them represents the innermost naThat we know little in comparison to
know, that in addition to some actual
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mental symbol and (2) that
the idea of mind must always be thought in connection
with material bodies, produces an ingenious antithesis
that the idea of matter

COURT.

in this case
in the

making a vacancy

means

world, but

dollars a day

the
it

jail.

is

for another scapegoat,

This kind of atonement

ruinously cheap

although during the war,

;

who
is

less

hold

which

not unusual

when furnished
many a man died

country by means of a substitute costing

grum-

will

for

two

for his

than five hundred

prit

once knew a soldier to falsely accuse himself of stealing
and take his punishment like a man, the real culpaying him for so doing a plug of tobacco down, and promis-

ing

him

dollars.

from the

I

sutler,

dollars in

five

money

" after pay day," a time indefinite

I regret to say that when pay
bargain was repudiated on the
was against good morals and contrary to public
policy.
The expiator complained to me about it, but I could only
advise him never to expiate in future except for cash.

as the farmer's "after harvest."

day came the

ground that

We

latter part of the

it

*
*
are a hero-worshipping people, but

we

like

our heroes

example General Grant. The statue of him was unveiled a few days ago in Chicago, and the ceremony of unveiling
it caused the most popular and populous demonstration ever seen in
the city.
For hours, military and civic societies marched through
the streets in high procession on their way to offer incense to the
statue, while enthusiastic citizens rallied by swarms around the
monument to assist in the ceremony. Of this cheering multitude
of worshippers tens of thousands had censured General Grant in
dead

;

for

THE OPKN
man worthy of utter detestation, a corrupt magisand a Ciesar meditating the overthrow of liberty. At the

his lifetime as a
trate,

unveiling ceremonies those very same unrelenting critics bowed
Shall it become a
before his graven image in reverent adoration.

precept of American party
of the dead,

we speak nothing but good

spirit, that

and nothing but

evil of the living?

*

*

which can be setStill more dreary is Moltke's prophecy of
be hoped," he says, " that wars will become less
frequent in the degree in which they become more terrible." So,
that, until wars make the whole earth a desolation, and " the multitudinous seas incarnadine," there will be no hope for international harmony
and gospels of peace and good will to men must
tions maintain separate lives there will be strife

arms."

tled only with
relief,

"It

is

to

;

and effigies, and images, reminds me of
this newspaper paragraph which I had nearly forgotten, "Skirmish shooting was the order of the day at Fort Sheridan yesterday.
The skirmish is a novel feature, in which a dozen scouts advance
towards dummy Indians and fire off hand. The scores were good,
two contestants making 130 points out of a possible zoo." This
kind of skirmish drill amounts to something it has a stimulus in
There is a martial humor
it almost equal to the taste of blood.
about it which is nowhere to be found in the dull sport of shooting
at a blank target which even when you hit it, gives back no sugI agree that " the
gestion of death nor portent of a broken bone.
scores were good"; 130 Indians for 200 shots appears to be extremely good but I account for the victory by this good luck that
the dummy Indians had no guns in their hands, and could not
I am confirmed in this opinion by the fact that in actfire back.
Speaking of

COURT.

soldiers,

remain a mockery, and a conjurer's jingle of words.

M. M. Trumbull.

BOOK REVIEWS.
National LiBER.^L Club. Political Economy Circle. Transactions,
Vol. I. Edited by J. H. Levy, Honorary Secretary of the Circle. London P. S. King & Son. 1891.
;

;

;

ual fighting our soldiers never get 130 Indians out of a possible

200; although the Indians have been

known

do

to

much

better

than that, and even to get 700 soldiers, out of a possible 700, a
record which has not been broken yet. Of course as a matter of
taste the drilling of soldiers to shoot at dummy Indians is open to

and if we should hear that in Arizona or Dakota the Indians were shooting dummy soldiers by way of practice, we should
sadly say that it was a proof of their bloodthirsty disposition, and
it would prove them to be savthe evidence would be conclusive
The deplorable effects of such training on the mind was
ages.

criticism

;

;

made
had

visible in that

his

Clark Street tragedy when a

neck broken by a soldier from the

the soldier being in town,

"on

fort.

It

pass," as they call

the inspiration of Chicago whiskey, a nectar

dummy

which

Indian

appears that

came under

it,

The

fall.

soldier

Political

Economy

London, resembles

Circle of the National Liberal Club, of

Club of
and after
dinner, a paper is read on some economic subject by some competent person, perhaps a member of the club, and perhaps not,
after which criticisms of the argument are in order.
The papers
then are carefully edited, and published in book form.
The Right
Hon. Charles Pelham Villiers, M. P., is President of the club.
The volume of "Transactions" before us contains six addresses, on the following subjects respectively: "The Economic
Principles Which Should Guide Legislation With Regard to the
Occupation of Land," by the Right Hon. Leonard H. Courtney,
M. P., Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons " International
Migration and Political Economy," by J. S. Mann, M. A., of Trinity College, Oxford; "The Report of the Gold and Silver Commission," by Alfred Milnes, M. A.; "The Rate of Interest," by
Sidney Webb, LL. B., Lecturer on Political Economy at the City
of London College
"Distribution as a Branch of Economics," by
J. H. Levy, late Lecturer on Logic and Economics at the Birkbeck
Institution; "The Migration of Labor," by Hubert Llewellyn
Smith, B. A., Late Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
in

its

the Sunset

essential features

At certain times the members dine together

Chicago.

;

;

;

The

in its fine effect

upon the imagination has no equal in the world. Passing along
the street he saw a dummy Indian in front of a cigar store, and
The
the martial spirit of the soldier was immediately aroused.
Indian, in a friendly way, offered the soldier a bunch of dummy
cigars, but the white brave thought it was a tomahawk, and imHe beat him severely about the
mediately attacked the Indian.
face, and then after a desperate wrestle flung him heavily to the
ground, the Indian's neck being broken in the

The

merit of papers like these

is,

that the writers of them, be-

ing limited in time by the rules of the club, are compelled to say

much as possible in the fewest possible words. Books have
been written on these themes which do not contain as many ideas
and reasons as are condensed into these essays. They are all of
them of the highest quality both in matter and style.
/i//r.
as
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will

esting, but
feel

as

stern.

if

a cannon were talking to us, logical, passionless, and

Our sentimental hope

charity, ethics, religion,

and

commerce,

of peace through

all

All

communications should be addressed

the other gentle agencies vanishes

before this hard moralising of the old Field Marshal,

"Only

the

sword holds the sword in the scabbard." If this is true, then it
is only its sword and not its cause that gives a nation peace
and
Shakespeare was wrong when he eaid, "Thrice is he armed who

(Nixon Building,
P. O.

DRAWER

hath his quarrel just";

for,

according to Moltke, justice counts

this

matter the soldier

is

wiser than the poet.

Unfortunately, in

The wars

modern wars were as a skirmish to
says Moltke, "Wars to- day draw the whole people

comparison
field

to the

— hardly a family without

without hope

if

its

is

The

La

Salle Street,)
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